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PREVENTION OF ANTIUNION
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES
THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE*
I Introduction
Nearly all rank-and-file employees in private businesses of any sub-
stantial size in the United States are protected by federal law against anti-
union discrimination. The Railway Labor Act applies to the railroad
and airline industries.' The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) ap-
plies to all other businesses whose operations "affect [interstate] com-
merce" in almost any way.2 Supervisory and managerial personnel,
domestic servants, and agricultural workers are excluded from this fed-
eral scheme.3 Separate federal law covers the employees of the federal
government.4 About thirty of the fifty states have statutes ensuring the
right to organize on the part of some or most of the state and municipal
employees. This paper will concentrate on the NLRA, by far the most
significant legislation dealing with private sector employees.
The NLRA forbids antiunion discrimination in sweeping, compre-
hensive terms. Administrative and judicial decisions interpreting the
statute have been generous, for the most part, in extending the reach of
the substantive right. The principal deficiency is that remedies are often
too little and too late. For example, a recalcitrant employer can fre-
quently kill off an organizing drive with an intimidating series of dis-
charges; and when the sanction comes, two or three years later, it may be
barely more than a slap on the wrist.
* Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Report given at the First
American Regional Congress on Labor Law and Social Security, Buenos Aires, Argen-
tina, April 27-30, 1987.
1. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
2. 49 Stat. 499 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (NLRA).
3. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
4. See, e.g., the Federal Relations Service Labor-Management and Employee Relations Law,
92 Stat. 1111 (1978), 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1982).
5. Rehmus, Labor Relations in the Public Sector, in LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 3-5 (H. Edwards, R. Clark & C. Craver eds., 2d ed. 1979).
HeinOnline  -- 9 Comp. Lab. L.J. 384 1987-1988
ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION: U.S.
I. Protected Activities
Section 7 of the NLRA6 has been called the Magna Carta of work-
ers in the United States.7 It establishes the right of employees to "self-
organization", which includes not only the right to "form" or "join" la-
bor organizations and to "bargain collectively" but also the right to en-
gage in "other concerted activities" for "mutual aid or protection". A
"labor organization" is broadly defined as "any organization" or any
"employee representation committee" in which employees participate,
and which exists for the purpose of "dealing with employers" on almost
any subject.' Employees also have the right under section 7 to refrain
from unionization or other concerted activity.
Concerted conduct typically, but not necessarily, involves action by
a union, such as a union-called strike or work stoppage. Informal groups
of employees are also protected in banding together to better their eco-
nomic lot or to protest undesirable working conditions.9 A single em-
ployee is protected in seeking, even unsuccessfully, to persuade others
too support a union or to participate in some other form of concerted
activity.'" An individual employee is also protected if he asserts an argu-
able claim under a collective bargaining agreement, even though he acts
solely on his own behalf, since invoking the labor contract is deemed "an
integral part of the process that gave rise to the agreement.""
There are limits to this expansion of the concept of "concerted" ac-
tivity. A single employee, or even several employees acting on an indi-
vidual basis, are not protected in a nonunion setting if they go to their
employer or to the public authorities to complain about a safety haz-
ard.'2 The presence of a union as the employees' representative may be
critical for the existence of certain rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has
held, for example, that section 7 covers the right to union representation
at an investigatory interview which an employee reasonably believes
could result in discipline.' 3 But the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), the agency created to administer the NLRA, does not recog-
nize a section 7 right in a nonunion employee to be represented by a co-
6. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
7. The Magna Carta was the great declaration of individual liberties which the barons of Eng-
land secured from King John at Runnymede in 1215. See G. TREVELYAN. ILLUSTRATED HISTORY
OF ENGLAND 169-73 (1956).
8. NLRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982).
9. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
10. Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964): see also Root-Carlin.
Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1313 (1951).
11. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822, 823 (1984).
12. Meyers Industries, Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. 1137 (1986).
13. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1965).
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worker at such an interview. 4
It may seem anomalous that the existence of concerted activity and
section 7 protections should sometimes turn on the almost accidental fac-
tor of whether an employee first tries to enlist the support of fellow work-
ers, or instead acts spontaneously on his own in lodging a protest with
the employer. However, one should realize that Congress' fundamental
purpose for adopting the NLRA (the Wagner Act) was to legitimate and
shield union organization; 15 not to pass an "unjust dismissal" law in dis-
guise. Therefore, the requirement of some modicum of group action or
attempted group action becomes understandable. The motives of the
Wagner Act's principal sponsors were both idealistic and pragmatic.
They wished to confer "equality of bargaining power"' 16 on workers
through collective action, thereby promoting "principles of social jus-
tice"' 7 and at the same time end the bitter, spreading industrial strife of
the mid-1930's.' 8
Not all concerted activity is protected by section 7. Protection is
lost if the activity has an unlawful objective or is carried on in an unlaw-
ful manner. Employees may be discharged for engaging in an illegal sec-
ondary boycott or for striking to compel an employer to commit an
unfair labor practice.' 9 Even if the objective is lawful, there is no protec-
tion under the NLRA if the concerted activity is criminal or tortious.
Examples would be violent picketing2" or a "sitdown" strike, the forcible
occupation of an employer's plant.2"
Most difficult to classify are the cases in which the concerted activity
is not illegal in the strict sense, but where it may seem so dubious, inap-
propriate or "indefensible" as an element of an ongoing employer-em-
ployee relationship that Congress would arguably not have intended to
protect it against employer reprisals. Included in this category are slow-
downs on the job, "quickie" intermittent strikes or unannounced work
stoppages; 22 and such "disloyalty" as the sharp, public disparagement of
the quality of an employer's product.23 The NLRB and the courts have
not provided satisfactory rationales for all of these decisions. Uncompli-
14. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 118 L.R.R.M. 1329 (1985).
15. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (declaring the policy of the United States to be that of
"encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and . . . protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association").
16. 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Wagner).
17. Id. at 10559 (remarks of Sen. Walsh).
18. Id. at 10351 (remarks of Sen. Walsh).
19. Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951).
20. Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 115 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1984).
21. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
22. See Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 26 L.R.R.M. 1493 (1950); see also Pacific Telephone
and Telegraph Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547, 33 L.R.R.M. 1433 (1954).
23. NLRB v. IBEW Local 1229, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
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mentary descriptions of an employer's output-especially that produced
by strikebreakers-would not seem entirely unexpected or exceptionable
in the course of a heated labor dispute, and not enough to justify the
forfeiture of job rights on the basis of a standard as vague as "disloyalty".
Some section 7 rights can be waived in certain circumstances. The
most obvious example is the "no-strike" clause contained in almost every
collective bargaining agreement, often negotiated as a quid pro quo for
the grievance and arbitration procedure.24 Most employees striking in
violation of a no-strike pledge are subject to discharge by their em-
ployer.25 However, certain section 7 rights are so sensitive that a union
may not be permitted to waive them on behalf of the employees. These
include the right to campaign at the work place during non-working time
either for or against an incumbent union,26 and the right to file unfair
labor practice charges with the Labor Board against either union or
employer.
2 7
III. Coercion and Discrimination
Specified types of employer and union conduct that impair employ-
ees' rights under section 7 are forbidden as "unfair labor practices" by
section 8 of the NLRA.28 The original Wagner Act of 1935 covered only
actions by employers. The Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 added a
roughly parallel code of union unfair labor practices.29 These prohibi-
tions do not apply to the acts of third parties, such as public officials or
local citizens, unless an employer or a labor organization somehow par-
ticipates in them.3°
Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A) forbid an employer or a union re-
spectively, to "restrain or coerce" employees in the exercise of section 7
rights. This general language plainly reaches behavior such as violence,3'
intimidation,32 and spying on employees.33 Such conduct was not en-
tirely uncommon in the early days of the Wagner Act; fortunately, it is
now relatively rare. Today the most frequent questions concern the limi-
tations an employer may place on organizational activity in the work
24. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
25. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 292-95 (1956).
26. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
27. Cf. NLRB v. Marine Shipbuilding Workers. 391 U.S 418 (1968).
28. NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
29. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982).
30. Compare Southland Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 813, 28 L.R.R.M. 1104 (1951), with Clarke
Mills, 109 N.L.R.B. 666, 34 L.R.R.M. 1402 (1954).
31. Clover Fork Coal Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 202, I-A L.R.R.M. 285 (1937).
32. See Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 626, I-A L.R.R.M. 585 (1937), rood. and enforced.
94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
33. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 20 N.L.R.B. 1100, 6 L.R.R.M. 59 (1940).
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place or the types of communications an employer may address to its
employees.
A. Union Organizing on Employer Premises
The NLRB and the courts have ordinarily been quite solicitous of
the property rights of American employers in allowing them to bar non-
employee union organizers from the premises as long as other channels
of communication are reasonably available. 4 However, access may be
required if the employer is operating in a remote, isolated location. 5 Un-
ions have generally not fared well with the argument that employees who
disperse widely at the end of the working day from large industrial com-
plexes within metropolitan areas are effectively as "isolated" from off-
premises organizing appeals as workers in a distant lumbering camp. 6
An employer's own employees are entitled to be on the premises,
and any restrictions on their efforts at self-organization must be justified
by the employer's need to maintain efficient production. 7 Rules against
union solicitation by employees during nonworking time (lunch periods,
rest breaks) are presumptively invalid.3 8 There are exceptions. A retail
store, for example, may be able to ban solicitation in the public areas of
the store even during employees' nonworking time, to prevent customer
confusion.39 In addition, an employer generally may ban the distribution
of union literature in the working areas of a plant during nonworking
time, because he has a legitimate interest in keeping the plant free of
litter.' Off-duty employees may be barred from soliciting within the
plant and other working areas, but not in parking lots, at gates, or in
other outside nonworking areas.4
Are unions or employees entitled to equal treatment with employers
in communicating with the work force? For instance, if an employer has
its supervisors distribute antiunion but noncoercive literature within a
plant during working hours, may the employer no longer enforce a rule
forbidding a like distribution of literature by the employees? Decrying
any attempt at "mechanical answers", the U.S. Supreme Court has an-
swered, No; labor organizations are not "entitled to use a medium of
34. NLRB v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
35. NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948).
36. See Monogram Models, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 705, 77 L.R.R.M. 1913 (1971); but cf. Scholle
Chemical Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 724, 78 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1971), enforced, 82 L.R.R.M. 2410 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909 (1973).
37. See e.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 1952).
38. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
39. Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952).
40. Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 51 L.R.R.M. 1110 (1962).
41. Tri-County Medical Center, 222 N.L.R.B. 1089, 91 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1976).
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communication simply because the employer is using it."142 Yet, the
NLRB has recognized that in certain circumstances an employer's resort
to an otherwise lawful but peculiarly effective mode of communication
may obligate it to allow the union to respond in kind. Thus, when the
management of a retail store which had imposed a broad but valid no-
solicitation rule (applicable to both working and nonworking time on the
premises) gave so-called "captive audience" speeches to amassed assem-
blies of employees on company property just prior to a union representa-
tion election,43 this was held to create such a "glaring imbalance in
communication" that the employer's refusal of the union's request for an
equal opportunity to address the employees was considered an unfair la-
bor practice.44 The Board does not extend this right of reply to a union
attempting to organize a manufacturing plant, where employees must be
permitted to solicit on their nonworking time,4" even though a good ar-
gument can be made that the work place is the most natural forum for all
parties to debate the merits of unionization.46
B. Communications to Employees
One of the most difficult problems confronting the NLRB is deter-
mining when employer communications are "coercive" and hence in vio-
lation of section 8(a)(1). Government regulation of any sort is, of course,
subject to the U.S. Constitution's guarantees of free speech. 47 Further-
more, the Taft-Hartley Act added section 8(c)48 to the NLRA to confirm
explicitly that the expression of any "views, arguments, or opinion"
would not even be considered "evidence" of an unfair labor practice un-
less it contained a "threat of reprisal" or "promise of benefit".
The Labor Board takes the position that employer statements must
be viewed against the background in which they are presented. What
might seem on its face an innocent expression of concern that unioniza-
tion would ultimately inflict "serious harm" on the employees may be
treated as a threat of retaliation if uttered in the context of "massive"
unfair labor practices.49 Similarly, the "totality of the circumstances"
42. NLRB v. Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958).
43. Section 9 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982), provides for secret-ballot elections to be
conducted by the NLRB to resolve "questions concerning representation" among employees in ap-
propriate bargaining units.
44. May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB, 136 N.L.R.B. 797, 49 L.R.R.M. 1862 (1962). en-
forcement denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963).
45. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 33 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1953).
46. See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under
the NLRA. 78 HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964).
47. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1787 n.) 1, 50 L.R.R.M. 1489 (1952).
48. NLRA § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
49. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1967).
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may indicate that employer references to plant closings elsewhere in the
area following unionization and strike activity were designed to instill a
fear of reprisals and thereby coerce employees.5 0 Employers are entitled,
however, to make reasonable "predictions" based on "objective fact"
concerning the "demonstrably probable consequences" of unionization,
including a plant shutdown. 5 '
In my judgment, this search for the elusive element of veiled
"threats" in employer statements is often a futile and perhaps misguided
task. The frequent disagreements between the NLRB and the reviewing
courts reflect the difficulty.5 2 The most extensive empirical study ever
undertaken on the subject casts serious doubt on whether employer state-
ments, however intimidating in tone, actually have much influence on the
employees' behavior in a representation election. 3 It might prove better
to spend less time worrying about the subtle psychological implications
of employer speeches and instead devote more effort to enabling unions
to get their own messages across effectively-if necessary, by granting
unions access to employer premises in appropriate circumstances; 4 for
example, when the work force is too large for employees to be contacted
in person away from the plant, or when an employer gives a captive-
audience speech so shortly before an election that the union has no time
for an adequate response by other means.
Interrogation of employees about their union activities was once re-
garded as coercive per se. " Now, if the questioning is not itself threaten-
ing, the NLRB will take into account "all the circumstances" to see
whether the interrogation may "reasonably" be said to interfere with sec-
tion 7 rights.56 Various factors are considered, including (1) any history
of employer discrimination, (2) the nature of the information sought,
-50. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
51. Id.
52. As an illustration, in NLRB v. Herman Wilson Lumber Co., 355 F.2d 426. 429 (8th Cir.
1966), the employer's speeches included the following remarks: -I will fight the Union in every legal
way possible .... If the Union calls an economic strike, you place your job on the line. You can be
permanently replaced. You can lose your job .... In dealing with the Union I'll deal hard with it-
I'll deal cold with it-I'll deal at arm's length with it." The NLRB held (2-1) that this statement
violated § 8(a)(1), but the court of appeals denied enforcement. (2-1).
53. See J. GE-IMAN. S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION EI.E.CTIONS:
LAW AND REALITY 128-30. 146-52 (1976); but cf. Freeman, Why arc, Unions Faring Poorly in
NLRB Representation Elections?, in CHALLENGES AND CHoIcEs FACING AMERICAN LABOR 45.
54-59 (and authorities cited) (T. Kochan ed. 1985).
54. The proposed Labor Reform Act of 1978, H.R. 8410, 95th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1977). wshich
was defeated by a Senate filibuster, would have directed the NLRB to use its rule-making authority
to establish guidelines providing unions an equal opportunity to reply to an employer's anliunion
speeches on company premises during an organizing drive. See also Bok. supra note 46. at 101-03:
GETMAN et. al., supra note 53, at 156-59 (and authorities cited).
55. Standard-Coosa-Thatcher, 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 24 L.R.R.M. 1575 (1949).
56. Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176, 116 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1984)aff'd, Hotel & Restaurant
Employees Local II v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985).
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(3) the rank of the questioner in the company hierarchy, (4) the location
[i.e., the boss' office] and method of the interrogation, and (5) the truth-
fulness of the reply.5 7 It is impermissible, however, to ask employees
questions of a "probing, inquisitive and focused nature."58 At least
before the advent of today's more pro-management "Reagan Board", a
systematic poll of employees concerning their union allegiance generally
had to be conducted by secret ballot and had to be accompanied by cer-
tain safeguards, including assurances against reprisal.59
The offer of an outright bribe to individual employees to refrain
from or oppose union activity is plainly an unlawful interference with
organizational rights.60 More controversially, the U.S. Supreme Court
has sustained the Labor Board in holding that even an employer's uncon-
ditional, permanent grant of economic benefits to its employees shortly
before a representation election violated section 8(a)(1), where the em-
ployer's purpose was to affect the outcome of the election. 6' Although
there was no hint that the benefits would be withdrawn if the workers
voted for the union, the Court concluded that the inherent danger of
"well-timed increases" is the "suggestion of a fist inside the velvet
glove."62 One might well ask whether this wasn't an excessively pater-
nalistic attitude toward the perceptiveness and good judgment of mature
workers.
C. Disparate or Adverse Treatment
Violations of section 8(a)(1) may occur regardless of an employer's
intent. For example, an employer may have established a broad no-solic-
itation rule many years ago to prevent quarrels among his workers over
political or religious issues. Nonetheless despite the absence of any antiu-
nion animus, the objective tendency of such a rule, if applied to union
solicitation on nonworking time, would be to inhibit the exercise of sec-
tion 7 rights.6 3 On the other hand, almost any job decision an employer
can make-to hire, to promote, to discharge, even to relocate opera-
tions-may become an unfair labor practice if it has an antiunion motiva-
tion, or if it treats certain employees differently because of their union
activities. 6 In the language of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA,65 an em-
57. See, e.g., Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964).
58. Raytheon Co., 279 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 121 L.R.R.M. 1291 (1985).
59. Struksnes Construction Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1967).
60. See Reliance Mfg. Co., 28 N.L.R.B. 1051, 7 L.R.R.M. 165 (1941): see also Sterling Cabinet
Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 6, 34 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1954).
61. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
62. Id.
63. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S 793 (1945).
64. There is one major exception to the rule that nearly any employer decision may be unlawful
if triggered by antiunion bias-an employer may go completely out of business even if it acts to avoid
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ployer may not engage in "discrimination" as to any employment term to
"encourage or discourage" union membership. Almost half of all the
unfair labor practice charges filed annually against employers involve al-
legations of discrimination.6 6
In the classic section 8(a)(3) case, the most difficult issue is a "sim-
ple" (but often deeply perplexing) question of fact: Why did the em-
ployer fire this employee? Why did this employer treat this employee less
well than that employee? Was it because this employee has been a habit-
ual absentee or drunkard for twenty years, and today's absence or intoxi-
cation was the "last straw"? Or was it because this employee was seen
wearing a union button for the first time last week? What was the em-
ployer's real reason? Motivation is key to a section 8(a)(3) violation.
In the processing of an unfair labor practice case, the charging party
is represented by the staff of the NLRB's General Counsel.67 The initial
hearing is held before an administrative law judge.6 8 As the moving
party, the General Counsel has the burden to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the employer has violated the NLRA.6 9
Suppose the employer acted out of "mixed motives", one motive
union-related and the other not. Once the General Counsel establishes
that the employer's action was based, at least in part on antiunion ani-
mus, then the employer will be liable unless it can show as an affirmative
defense by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the
same adverse action even if the employee had not engaged in protected
activities.7 °
IV Employer Responses to Protected Activity
A strike or other concerted activity is protected by statute but at the
same time it is an economic weapon whereby employees can bring bar-
gaining pressure to bear on their employer. An employer cannot take
reprisals against employees for exercising section 7 rights. Yet, an em-
ployer retains the right, according to the Court, to try to continue pro-
duction in the face of a strike, and to bring bargaining pressure of its own
to bear on the union and the employees. Over the years, the Court has
unionization. See Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1963). But an employer
may not relocate a plant if the reason for doing so is antiunion hostility. See Garwin Corp.. 153
N.L.R.B. 664, 59 L.R.R.M. 1405 (1965), enforced i part, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
65. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
66. NLRB, FORTY-FirrH ANNUA. REPORT 225 (1980).
67. See NLRA § 10. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982): see also R. SmrrH. L. MrRItiri)rtD.T. Sr. AN-
TOINE & C. CRAVER, LABOR REL ATIONS LAW: CASES AND MsvrLRIAi.s 58-63 (7th ed 1984).
68. Id.
69. Id. see also Miller Electric Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1959): NLRB v. West
Point Mfg. Co.. 245 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1957).
70. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
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developed an approach, by no means wholly consistent and surely not as
predictive as might be desired, for harmonizing these various strains of
analysis in different contexts.
The starting point is that, although a section 8(a)(3) violation re-
quires a discriminatory motive, specific evidence of subjective intent is
not always necessary. The "natural foreseeable consequences of certain
actions may warrant the inference" of the proscribed intent.7 In its
most definitive exposition of this doctrine, the Court divided employers'
conduct into two categories: that which is "inherently destructive" of
employee rights, and that which has a "comparatively slight" effect on
those rights.72 An employer that has engaged in conduct of either type
has the burden of establishing that it was motivated by "legitimate objec-
tives". Then, if such proof is forthcoming, and the adverse effect of those
objectives is "comparatively slight", there is no violation of section
8(a)(3), unless a subjective antiunion motivation is proved. But there is a
violation if the employer's conduct was "inherently destructive" of em-
ployee rights, without proof of improper motivation, although the con-
duct may have been prompted by valid business considerations. This
reasoning has been applied to the award of "super-seniority" and to bar-
gaining lockouts, and in retrospect it would appear applicable to replace-
ment strikers.
A. Strike Replacements and "Super-Seniority"
In very strong dictum the Court has declared that it is not an unfair
labor practice for an employer to hire "permanent" replacements during
an economic strike in an effort to carry on his business.73 But the NLRB,
with judicial approval, has attached an important qualification to this
principle. Even though economic strikers whose positions have been fil-
led by permanent replacements need not be given their jobs back at the
end of the strike, they remain employees and they are entitled to full
reinstatement upon the departure of the replacements. 4 In addition, if a
strike is called to protest an employer's unfair labor practices rather than
to improve economic conditions, the employer may not hire permanent
replacements and must reinstate the strikers upon request.7" Neither the
71. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963).
72. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
73. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
74. Laidlaw Corp.. 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); see also NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375
(1967).
75. See Collins & Aikman Corp., 165 N.L.R.B. 678, 65 L.R.R.M. 1484 (1967); see also Ameri-
can Cyanamid Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1979) (union right to demand reinstatement on
behalf of the strikers based on unfair labor practices strike upheld; even if the strike had been an
economic strike, the workers had a right to reinstatement until they were permanently replaced).
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Court nor the Labor Board has ever explained why an employer should
be able to hire "permanent" strike replacements-without at least some
showing that temporary replacements were inadequate or unobtainable.
An employer involved in an economic strike may not go further and
grant so-called "super-seniority" to strike replacements and strikers re-
turning to work.7 ' The employer in one case awarded this special credit
to ensure itself a sufficient supply of workers by guaranteeing them pro-
tection against future layoff. No specific evidence of subjective antiunion
intent was found. Nonetheless, despite the claimed business justification,
the Court concluded that the conduct was "inherently discriminatory"
and that "preferring one motive to another is in reality the far more deli-
cate task ... of weighing the interest of the employees in concerted activ-
ity against the interest of the employer in operating his business in a
particular manner."77 The NLRB, which had the primary responsibility
for striking this balance was entitled to treat the grant of super-seniority
as violative of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) for several reasons. It would, for
instance, affect the status of all strikers, whereas permanent replacements
would affect only those actually replaced. And it would, unlike perma-
nent replacements, create a cleavage in the work force which dwould
continue long after the strike was ended. In spite of these nice distinc-
tions, strikers who have been permanently replaced might understanda-
bly think the Court had strained at a gnat and swallowed a camel.
B. Bargaining Lockouts
Relying on the Supreme Court's "inherently discriminatory" theory
of employer conduct, the Labor Board formerly held that a bargaining
lockout-the withdrawal of work from employees to pressure them into
a contract settlement-was prohibited by sections 8(a)(1) and (3). The
Supreme Court ultimately disagreed, stating that the section does "not
give the Board a general authority to assess the relative economic power
of the adversaries in the bargaining process and to deny weapons to one
party or the other because of its assessment of that party's bargaining
power."78 Since there was no showing of actual antiunion motivation,
there was no statutory violation.
The Supreme Court's purported reconciliation of these decisions is
gravely flawed. What, exactly, does it mean to say that the NLRB may
determine that certain conduct is so "destructive" of employee rights as
76. NLRB v. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
77. Id. at 228.
78. American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965): see also NLRB v. Brown.
380 U.S. 278, 283 (1965).
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to "carry its own indicia of intent, ' 79 but then say that the Board may
not "deny weapons to one party or the other because of its assessment of
that party's bargaining power"? Why, more specifically, does super-sen-
iority fall within the unlawful "inherently destructive" category and per-
manent replacements and lockouts within the lawful "bargaining
weapon" category? What particular evidence should union, employer or
Board counsel assemble to demonstrate that "employee rights" are
threatened with "destruction" or, conversely that challenged conduct is a
mere exercise of "bargaining power"? In this area, the Supreme Coirt
has clearly defaulted on its principal obligation of articulating intelligible
standards for the guidance of the NLRB and the lower courts.
V. Procedures and Remedies
The major failings of the antidiscrimination scheme of the NLRA
are inadequate remedies and excessively slow and cumbersome proce-
dures. Any party aggrieved by a decision of an administrative law judge
has the right to appeal the five-member Board, itself. This clogs the pro-
cess; the result is that the average contested unfair labor practice case
takes almost a year and a half before final Board disposition.80 A better
method would be to allow the full Board to grant review on a discretion-
ary basis, or at least provide for some form of summary affirmance
procedure."'
Even a final order of the NLRB is not self-enforcing. If a party does
not voluntarily comply, legal enforcement must be sought in a federal
court of appeals.8 2 Which adds at least another year, on the average, to
the ultimate disposition of the claim.8 3 Then there is still the possibility
of a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The remedies eventually provided are often woefully deficient. Em-
ployees who were discharged discriminatorily can theoretically be rein-
stated with back pay (less interim earnings).8 4 But such relief, some two
to five or more years after the fact, is not likely to mean much. The
organizing effort has collapsed and the fired workers have moved else-
where. The employer will probably treat any back pay award as a license
to maintain its "union-free" environment.
79. NLRB v. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. 221, 231 (1963). How should the Court's test be applied if
an employer, as a bargaining tactic, not only locks out its union employees but also resumes opera-
tions with replacements either temporary or permanent? A divided Labor Board held that the use of
temporary replacements was allowable. Harter Equipment, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 71, 122 L.R.R.M.
1219 (1986); order upheld 829 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1987).
80. NLRB. FORTY-Six'rH ANNUAl. REPORT 228 (1981).
81. H.R. 8410, supra note 54, would have provided for summary affirmances.
82. NLRA §§ 10(e) and (f), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e) and (f) (1982).
83. Miller, Routes to Reform, NLRB Release R-1297 (1973).
84. NLRA § 10(c). 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
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Under section 10() of the NLRA, the Board is actually empowered
to seek a temporary injunction from the federal district court to restore
an alleged discriminatee to his job pending disposition of the complaint
against the employer."5 But the Board rarely petitions for such interim
relief,86 apparently under the impression that the courts are reluctant to
grant such relief. Aggressive use of section 10(j) would be a significant
step forward. Another would be a legislative authorization of the sort
unsuccessfully proposed in Congress in 1978,87 for the award of double
back pay to certain victims of discrimination, for example victims of
"willful" discrimination or discrimination during an organizing
campaign.
Perhaps most distressing of all is the impunity with which an intran-
sigent employer can flout its duty to bargain with a union which repre-
sents a majority of its employees. 88 Instead of seeking a secret-ballot
election conducted by the NLRB, which is its right,89 suppose an em-
ployer responds to a union request for recognition by firing all the union
leaders, and by threatening to fire any others who take their places. The
union files a battery of unfair labor practice charges. In due course, i.e.,
two or three years later, the employer will confront a series of court-
enforced Board orders, one of which will simply direct the employer to
begin bargaining with the union. That the employer has successfully
avoided negotiations for several years, and has managed to deprive the
employees of the economic gains they could have realized from a collec-
tive bargaining agreement during that period, will be almost totally ig-
nored. No make-whole remedy will be provided to the victims of even a
flagrantly unlawful refusal to bargain.9 That too is a defect that would
have been addressed by the ill-fated labor reform legislation of 1978."'
The collective bargaining agreement of a unionized employer will
often contain a provision prohibiting antiunion discrimination. Alleged
violations, like alleged violations of other provisions of the contract, are
customarily subject to the parties' grievance and arbitration procedure.
The difference is that the contractual commitment against antiunion dis-
crimination overlaps the statutory prohibition of analogous unfair labor
85. NLRA § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 160(i) (1982).
86. NLRB, supra note 80, at 139.
87. H.R. 8410, supra note 54.
88. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (employer was ordered by the NLRB
to recognize a union which represented a majority of its employees when the employer's unfair labor
practices prevented a fair representation election from being held).
89. See generally Linden Lumber Div., Summer. & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301. 307-09 (1974).
90. See Ex-CelI-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107.74 L.R.R.M. 1740(1970): seea/so Tiidee Products.
Inc., v. NLRB, 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972). enforced, 502 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974). cert. denied. 421
U.S. 991 (1975).
91. H.R. 8410, supra note 54.
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practices under section 8(a)(1) and (3). The NLRA expressly provides
that the Labor Board's power to prevent unfair labor practices will "not
be affected by any other means of adjustment . . . established by agree-
ment."9 2 Nevertheless, in appropriate circumstances, the Board will de-
fer to or honor the parties' arbitration procedures or the arbitral awards
emanating from them, even with regard to alleged unfair labor practices.
The NLRB's current position is to accept an existing arbitration
award if (1) the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor
practice issue, (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the fazts
relevant to resolving that issue, and (3) the arbitrator's decision can be
interpreted consistently with the statute. 93 Moreover, the Board will sus-
pend its own processes and await an award from the parties' arbitration
procedure where (1) the action challenged was not designed to under-
mine the union, (2) it was based on a substantial claim of contractual
privilege, and (3) it appears that the arbitral award will resolve both the
unfair labor practice issue and the contract interpretation issue in a man-
ner compatible with the policy of the NLRA.94 Unions and employers
are thus enabled, if they wish, to "keep their own houses in order" with-
out excessive governmental intervention. The NLRB may be overly
obliging, however, when it applies the second doctrine dealing with
deferral prior to an award, to individual employees' claims of antiunion
discrimination. 95
VI. Concluding Comments
Article 2 of the International Labour Organization's Convention 87
on Freedom of Association reads like a more succinct (though more
broadly applicable) version of section 7 of the NLRA where it states,
"Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the
right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization con-
cerned, to join organizations of their own choosing without previous au-
thorization." 96 It can fairly be said that substantive law in the United
States embodies the protections against antiunion discrimination envis-
aged by the ILO.9 7 Similarly, the employees' organizational rights in this
country compare favorably with those guaranteed by the laws of a cross-
92. NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
93. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 115 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1984).
94. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
95. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 115 L.R.R.M. 1049; but cf. Hendrickson
Bros.,, 272 N.L.R.B. 438, 117 L.R.R.M. 1440 (1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1985) (there is no
deferral if it appears that the union will not represent the individual grievant diligently).
96. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 1919-1981, 4 (1982).
97. Even the public employees in states not authorizing collective bargaining for them have a
federal constitutional right to free association and organization. See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398
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section of the nations of Western Europe.9" The deficiencies, as discussed
earlier, lie chiefly in the area of remedies and procedure for enforcement.
More profoundly, the problem in the United States is a matter of
employer attitude. The intensity of opposition to unionization, which is
exhibited by the American employer, has no parallel in the Western in-
dustrial world.9 9 There is keen irony here. Ours is the most conserva-
tive, least ideological of all labor movements, traditionally committed to
the capitalistic system and to the principle that management should have
the primary responsibility for managing. "o Yet, employers will pay mil-
lions of dollars to experts in "union avoidance" in order to maintain their
nonunion status.' 0 ' In part, this resistance is explained by the highly
decentralized character of American industrial relations. Because of this
decentralization, an employer typically must confront a union on a one-
to-one basis, without the protective shield of an association to negotiate
on behalf of all or substantially all of the firms in a particular industry, as
is true in Western Europe. In part, the resistance to union organization
may result, among both employers and employees, from an ingrained
American attitude of rugged individualism and the ideal of the classless
society.'1 2 Until there is a more widespread and genuine acceptance of
the legitimacy of worker organization, law can at best provide only par-
tial protection against antiunion discrimination.
F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968). That leaves only a handful of private sector, nonagricultural workers in
purely intrastate businesses with no organizational rights.
98. See generally Wedderburn, Discrimination in the Right to Organise and the Right to be a
Non-Unionist, in DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 367-90 (F. Schmidt ed. 1978); see also
Pankert, Freedom of Association, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
146-65 (R. Blanpain ed. 1982).
99. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1394, 1409-11 (1971).
100. See, e.g., LABOR AND AMERICAN POLITICS 4-5, passim (C. Rehmus, D. McLaughlin & F.
Nesbitt eds. 1978).
101. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS OF THE COMM. ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR, 98TH CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON THE FAILURE OF LABOR LAW-A
BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS (Comm. Print 1984).
102. Bok, supra note 99, at 1458-62.
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